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IN THE

SUPRE~tr7E

COURT

of the

STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

Case No.
vs.

9281

'THEODORE I. GEURTS,

)

Defendant and Appellant.

PETITION FOR REHEARING AND RECONSIDERATION

COMES NOW the defendant, THEODORE I. GEURTS,
and moves the court for a rehearing of the above entitled case
and reconsideration of the court's opinion issued therein on
February 3, 1961, upon the following grounds:
1. The court erroneously stated and assumed that defend-

ant's counsel, prior to the trial, had been permitted access to
the transcript of the testimony of the state's witnesses as given
before the grand jury.
2. The court erroneously assumed and stated that the

trial court's refusal to permit the defendant to take depositions
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was based upon the fact that the defendant had been otherwise
furnished full information as to the charges.
3. The court erroneously assumed and stated that the
defendant sought depositions of the state's witnesses only for
the purpose of discovery.
4. The court erroneously held that the information given
to the defendant in the answers to interrogatories was sufficient
to use as a basis for cross-examination of the state's witnesses.
5. The refusal of the court to grant the defendant the
right to take the depositions of the state's witnesses, or in the
alternative a preliminary hearing, deprived the defendant of
due process of law in violation of Section 7, Article I of the
Constitution of the State of Utah, and in violation of the 14th
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of
America.
6. The court erred in holding that there was a common
law crime known as umalfeasance in office" which Should
have advised persons of ordinary intelligence of the meaning
of such term.
7. The court erred in holding that the three charges in

the accusation in this case were such charges as could be charged
in a single indictment and tried in a single trial under the rules
of criminal procedure of the state of Utah.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY STATED AND ASSUMED THAT DEFENDAN'f'S COUNSEL, PRIOR TO
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THE TRIAL, Hi\D BEEN PERMITTED ACCESS TO THE
,_fRANSCRIPT OF THE TESTIMONY OF THE STATE'S
WITNESSES AS GIVEN BEFORE THE GRAND JURY.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY ASSUMED AND STATED THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO PERMIT
THE DEFENDANT TO TAKE DEPOSITIONS WAS BASED
UPON THE FACT THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD BEEN
OTHERWISE FLTRNISHED FULL INFORMATION AS TO
THE CHARGES.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY ASSUMED AND STATED THAT THE DEFENDANT SOUGHT DEPOSITIONS
OF THE STATE'S WITNESSES ONLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF DISCOVERY.
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT THE
INFORMATION GIVEN TO THE DEFENDANT IN THE
ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES WAS SUFFICIENT
TO USE AS A BASIS FOR CROSS-EXAMINATION OF
THE STATE'S WITNESSES.
POINT V
THE REFUSAL OF THE COURT TO GRANT THE
DEFENDANT THE RIGHT TO TAKE THE DEPOSITIONS
OF THE STATE'S WITNESSES, OR IN THE ALTERNA-
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TIVE A PRELIMINARY HEARING, DEPRIVED THE
DEFENDANT OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 7, ARTICLE I OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH, AND IN VIOLATION
OF THE 14TH AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
Counsel will argue these points together as they relate
generally to the same subject matter.
Both the prevailing and the dissenting optnton assume
that counsel for defense had access to the transcript of the
grand jury proceedings. This is not true. Counsel has not seen
the transcript to this date.
The decision of this court upholding the right of counsel
for Commissioner Geurts in the criminal case to see the grand
jury transcript was issued on September 10, 1959. In October
Judge Faux issued his ruling on the defense motion to quash.
Immediately the defendant filed a demand for a bill of particulars. This demand came on for hearing on November 2,
1959, and was granted by the court. At that time counsel for
the defendant informally inquired of Judge Faux as to when
he would have the grand jury transcript ''screened" so as to
permit the defendant's counsel to examine the same. Judge
Faux stated that the work of screening would be quite extensive; that he would not undertake it until it appeared that
the criminal case was going to trial and that therefore, the
matter should stand as it was until the bill of particulars
was furnished. However, he stated, when the criminal case
approached trial this transcript would be made available to
the defendant in sufficient time for adequate examination.
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This appeared then and it now appears to be a logical position for Judge Faux to have taken, and the defendant took
no exception thereto. However, the bill of particulars was
never furnished and the criminal case never did come anywhere near trial. In fact the facts and circumstances force
the conclusion that one of the reasons why the criminal case
was never brought to trial was that the district attorney was
willing to go to any lengths to prevent the defendant's counsel
from examining the grand jury transcript.
If there is any question in the court's mind as to whether
this transcript has been made available to counsel for the
defense, it can be dispelled by reading pages 310 and 311
of the record (Tr. 224 and 225). There District Attorney
Banks attempted to cross-examine Mr. Geurts from the grand
jury transcript. Counsel for the defense objected to this procedure on the grounds that the grand jury transcript had
never been made available to the defendant for examination.
The objection was sustained by Judge Van Cott.
The principal premise, therefore, upon which the court
bases its conclusion that the refusal to permit the taking of
depositions was not prejudicial falls, and the court should
change its position and hold that this error was prejudicial.
In its opinion the court concludes that Judge Van Cott' s
denial of the defendant's demand to take the depositions of
the state, s witnesses was based upon the ground that the
defendant already had full information in the case. A reading
of the record shows that this is not so. At page 20 of the
record is found the state, s motion to suppress the taking of
depositions. This motion is not upon the ground that the
defendant already had all information, but upon the ground

7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

((that the defendant does not have the right to take depositions in this action in that this action is civil in nature but
crtminal in form." This is the basis upon which the motion
was sought and the basis upon which Judge Van Cott orally
stated from the bench that he was granting the motion. Furthermore, it is a basis that this court has already held was
erroneous.
The court further is not justified in its statement that in
regard to the taking of depositions the defendant does not
((argue their value for impeachment or cross-examination."
It is true that in the brief of the defendant counsel devotes
this section principally to the question of the use of the
depositions as a means of eliminating Count I prior to trial.
This was done principally because this is the point that appeared
to counsel to be the one which required the most discussion.
The use of depositions for the purpose of impeachment and
cross-examination and the disadvantage which comes from
the lack of such depositions is too clear to anyone who has
tried a law suit to require that it be labored in a brief.
Under the points relied upon on appeal, we stated ''The
court erred in denying the defendant the right to take the
depositions of witnesses prior to trial, or in the alternative
to a preliminary hearing." The question of the use of depositions for impeachment and cross-examination came up and
was discussed at some length during the oral argument on
the case. At that time counsel stated that he felt he had been
prejudiced by the lack of depositions for this purpose. If the
court will recall, Mr. Justice Wade from the bench asked the
counsel for the defendant if he had not talked to the witnesses
and did not know \vhat they were going to say. In response
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I;

I.
I

I:

to this question from Justice Wade, counsel for the defendant
stated that in regard to Count I he had talked to Mr. Reed
and that Mr. Reed had discussed the matter rather freely,
and that as to such count, the defendant's counsel felt he
was under no disadvantage. Counsel further stated, however,
that the witnesses as to Count II and Count III were far from
willing to discuss the matter freely and that counsel felt he
was under a distinct disadvantage as to these two counts.
Any member of this court who has ever defended a
criminal case must be well aware of the reluctance of state
witnesses to talk freely to counsel for the defense prior to
the time the case comes to trial.
It is difficult to see how the information given to the
defendant in the state's answers to interrogatories ( R. 14-17)
could in any way be utilized for the purpose of cross-examination of the witnesses. While this document is somewhat
more voluminous and verbose than the accusation itself, it
is certainly no more detailed and offers no information that
can be used in cross-examination. It merely states that three
men, Gerardus Kip, Helmeth F. Kleist, and Joseph W. Bertram,
on four occasions between February 1, 1959 and May 31, 1959
took soil, shrubs and trees to the homes of the defendant and
his son-in-law. It does not say who took what and in what
quantities, or on what certain days. It gives no details which
would permit counsel on cross-examinaton to determine
whether or not they were city trees and shrubs, as contended
by the state, or privately owned trees and shrubs, as contended
by the defendant; or whether the city employees did this work
on city time, as contended by the state, or on their own time,
as contended by the defendant. Other than to give a panoramic

9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

view of what the state claimed, they were valueless. Had the
defendant been permitted to take depositions as this court
has held he was entitled to do, he would have tied this matter
down to details which he could have checked before trial and
could have determined the credibility of these particular
witnesses, both from the standpoint of their interest in the
case and the accuracy of their recollection of what had occurred.
The denial of this right, of which this court acknowledges
the defendant has been deprived, has deprived the defendant
of his right of a fair trial and to due process of law in violation
of Section 7, Article I of the Constitution of the State of Utah
and the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States.
POINT VI
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE
WAS A COMMON LAW CRIME KNOWN AS ((MALFEASANCE IN OFFICE" WHICH SHOULD HAVE ADVISED PERSONS OF ORDINARY INTELLIGENCE OF
THE MEANING OF SUCH TERM.
The court states in its opinion ((malfeasance is a crime
recognized at common law." With this statement counsel
for the defense takes issue. Reference is made to our brief,
pages 19, 20 and 21. At common law as at present the term
malfeasance is a generic term describing a group of offenses.
It is not an offense in and of itself. It is just as general a
term as the word ((tort,, which covers a multitude of civil
wrongs under the common law. It is not a term of any exact
or definite meaning. We agree that the framers of our
constitution quite properly made public officers removable
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from office for malfeasance in office. This, however, is not
a self-executing provision, but is a provision which requires
legislative implementation. The legislative implementation
under a general constituional term covering a broad scope
should not be mere! y in the language of the constitution, but
should be a definite and precise description of the acts prohibited. It is our contention that failure of the legislature
to so do has made the statute in question vulnerable under
the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
and Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of the State of Utah.
POINT VII
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY HELD THAT THE
THREE CHARGES IN THE ACCUSATION IN THIS CASE
WERE SUCH CHARGES AS COULD BE CHARGED IN A
SINGLE INDICTMENT AND TRIED IN A SINGLE TRIAL
UNDER THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE OF
THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF UTAH.
At the risk of again being censored by the court for being
ctoverzealous," counsel for the defense again urges that the
jury might well have been prejudiced against the defendant
by the evidence submitted by the state in its abortive attempt
to prove Count I. In answering this contention this court
states in effect that under the criminal law Counts I, II and
III could have been charged and tried together and that it
would lead to an absurdity if the dismissal or a finding of
not guilty as to one or more counts could be held to be
prejudicial against the defendant on the remaining count of
which he was found guilty.
Counsel represents to the court that under the rules of
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criminal procedure of this state, Counts I, II and III could
not have been charged together and could not have been tried
together. Sec. 77-21-31, U.C.A. 1953, covers the matter of
joinder of criminal offenses in a single information or indictment. This section as amended by Chapter 170 of the Laws
of Utah, 1957, provides that the information or indictment
must charge but one offense. It holds that the same offense
may be set forth in different forms under different counts or
that different offenses may be charged together where they
are related or connected together in their commission. Under
this section the court has held that the following offenses
may not be charged or tried together: Bigamy and adultery,
U. S. v. West, 7 Ut. 437, 27 P. 84; rape and adultery, State
v. Anderton, 69 Ut. 52, 252 Pac. 280.
We do not have here a situation where one series of acts
may give rise to two offenses and may thus be charged in two
counts such as forgery and the making and passing of a forged
instrument, or burglary and larceny. Here the offenses charged
are separate, unrelated and distinct. If Count I were brought
under the criminal law it would have to be brought under
the bribery statute or under the conflict of interest statute.
If Count II were brought under the criminal law, it would
be larceny or embezzlement. If Count III were brought under
the criminal law it would be aiding and abetting the preparation of a false or fictitious claim. Furthermore, there is no
connection between the acts that occurred so far as the time
or method of occurrence. They are separate, distinct and
independent transactions. These acts could not have been
joined or tried in a single indictment or information under
the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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We did not make a motion for severance because we
did not feel we were proceeding under the code of criminal
procedure, and other cases from this court involving removal
indicate that several causes can be joined. However, we do
maintain that recourse cannot be had to the criminal procedure
as a basis for a holding that joinder was not prejudicial. This
court itself points out that the facts involved in Count I are
separate and distinct from the facts in Count II, and therefore,
none of the evidence going to Count I could tend to prove
the defendant guilty of Count II. However, this court can
take judicial notice of the fact that the evidence under Count I
was of such an inflammatory nature that it might make the
jury much more ready to believe the defendant guilty of any
other offense of any nature whatsoever. Under these circumstances it is our position that it was an abuse of discretion
of the trial court to refuse a mistrial on the basis that the
defendant was prejudiced by having the jury hear the evidence
presented under Count I, notwithstanding the instruction of
the court that they should disregard the same. We are sure
the members of this court, as lawyers with extensive trial
practice either as counsel or judge, must agree that one of
the most futile gestures in our judicial procedure is the instruction to disregard evidence already heard.
CONCLUSION
The court has pointed out in its opinion that it may be
possible for counsel to dissect an instruction and show that
the individual parts thereof are faulty even though the instructions taken as a whole may properly inform the jury
as to the elements of the offense, and as to their duty in regard
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thereto. Likewise, it is possible for this court to take each
individual error in the case and say this alone would not have
prejudiced the substantial rights of the defendant when all
of the errors taken together may well have prevented the
defendant from having a fair and impartial trial.
This is not a case where the guilt of the defendant stands
out clearly. It is a case balanced on a razor's edge where any
error against the defendant may have been the thing that tipped
the scale. It is further a case where the single straw may not
have unduly ladened the camel, but the cumulative weight of
all the straws may have broken its back. Without doubt the
prosecutor and the court must be diligent in their efforts to
assure proper handling of public affairs, but the danger to
the public in this case, taken at its worst, v;eighs but little
in the balance beside what this conviction has done to a member
of this community and to his family. Any question as to
whether or not a fair and impartial trial was had should be
resolved in favor of a reversal of the court below.
Counsel urges that the court reconsider this case, reset
the same for oral argument if the court feels that such would
contribute to a reconsideration, and upon such reconsideration
with or without argument, reverse the decision of the court
below.
Respectfully submitted,
CALVIN L. RAMPTON
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant
721 Confl Bank Bldg.

Salt Lake City, Utah
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